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DISCLOSURE OF INSURANCE POLICY LIMITS
JOSEPH T. LAVORCI
ISCLOSURE of defendant's insurance policy limits is today a
highly controversial subject in the field of personal injury
litigation. The liberal view, supported by the "plaintiff attor-
neys," advances the theory that knowledge of the defendant's insur-
ance policy limits will accelerate the disposition of suits on a more
realistic basis. The conservative view, supported by the "defendant
attorneys," maintains that knowledge of the tort-feasor's financial
worth, usually determined by the limits of his insurance policy, is
irrelevant, immaterial and not germane to the issues in dispute.
This conflict of views and interests among lawyers raises the legal
proposition as to whether the plaintiff's attorney can compel the
defendant to disclose the limits of his insurance policy; whether he
can employ the tools of discovery available under the rules of civil
procedure of the state and federal courts to elicit this information
(1) at a deposition hearing, (2) by written interrogatories or (3) by
order of court to produce the liability policy for examination at a
pre-trial conference.
A survey of the decisions in state and federal cases in the eight
states (New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Tennessee, Michigan,
California, New York and Kentucky) in which this issue has been
decided evidences conflict. The first three states hold that such dis-
closures may not be compelled, the last four states reach the opposite
conclusion, and two federal cases from Tennessee are not in accord.
There are eleven cases in point: with two each from Tennessee,
California and New York. Of the eleven cases, four concern discov-
ery, three involve pre-trial examination, two pertain to interrogatories,
and two relate to orders for the perpetuation of testimony. These
cases range in time from 1931 to 1955.
The Circuit Court of New Jersey in 1931 in Gobeen v. Goheen,' a
case concerning interrogatories, declared: "The interrogatories pro-
pounded are not material to the issue and are not relevant and compe-
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tent evidence for the plaintiffs. Therefore, the motion to strike out the
interrogatories is granted."
The District Court of the United States for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania in 1952 in McClure v. Boeger,2 a case dealing with
discovery under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28
U.S.C.A., ruled:
... Whatever advantages the plaintiff might gain are not advantages which
have anything to do with his presentation of his case at trial and do not lead to
disclosure of the kind of information which is the objective of discovery pro-
cedure .... [T]o grant this motion would be to unreasonably extend that pro-
cedure beyond its normal scope and would not be justified.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota in 1955 in Jeppesen v. Swanson,'
a case involving discovery procedure, stated: "Our decision is in-
tended to hold only that, where the information is sought for the
sole purpose of evaluating a case for the purpose of determining
whether it would be advisable to settle, it is not discoverable."
The District Court of the United States for the Eastern District
of Tennessee in 1955 in McNelley v. Perry,4 a case pertaining to
interrogatories under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
declared:
As a general rule, the purpose of seeking information from an adversary,
or a witness, is two-fold: (1) To use it in the trial, or (2) to use it as a lead
to information for use in the trial. It is not shown in this case that the informa-
tion sought about insurance would be relevant to either purpose.
Thus, under the authority of the preceding four cases from state
courts in New Jersey and Minnesota and federal courts in Pennsyl-
vania and Tennessee, to compel the disclosure of the defendant's
policy limits would be improper because the evidence adduced by
such disclosure would be immaterial, irrelevant, incompetent and
beyond the objective of, and without the scope of, discovery ma-
chinery.
The District Court of the United States for the Eastern District
of Tennessee in 1951 in Brackett v. Woodall Food Products, Inc.,5
a case relating to discovery under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, stated: "The Court is of the opinion, however, that
the plaintiffs should have an opportunity to examine the liability in-
surance policy of their alleged tort-feasor on the broad viewpoint
2 105 F. Supp. 612, 613 (1952).
8 243 Minn.'547, 68 N.W 2d 649, 658 (1955).
4 18 F.R.D. 360, 361 (1955). 512 F.R.D. 4, 5 (1951).
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that it is relevant to the subject matter of the litigation, and within
the purview of Rules 34 and 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, even though such policy would not be admissible in evi-
dence. . . ." The same federal court, but speaking through a different
judge, four years later in the McNelley case attempted to reconcile
the apparent conflict in the two decisions thus: "If the defendant is
insolvent so that pro-ration of insurance may become an issue among
various claimants, the question of insurance would become material.
This was apparently the situation in the case of Brackett v. Woodall
Food Products, Inc."
The Supreme Court of Michigan in 1933 in Layton v. Cregan and
Mallory Company, Inc.," a case concerning discovery procedure
declared that: "It is first contended by the defendant that the plaintiff
is not entitled to a discovery because it calls for matters entirely
foreign and irrelevant to the issue. We do not think so. The owner-
ship of the car was put in issue by the pleadings. If the insurance
policy shows ownership, it is admissible in evidence for that purpose."
The holding in this case can be distinguished from the other cases
compelling disclosure by the fact that if policy limits were disclosed,
such disclosure was only ancillary to the issue, not of financial re-
sponsibility, but of the disputed ownership of the automobile.
The Supreme Court of California in 1937 in Demaree v. The
Superior Court in and for Ventura County,7 a case dealing with an
order for the perpetuation of testimony, stated that: "We think it
must be conceded that the provisions of the policy of insurance are
germane to petitioners' cause and material to their anticipated action,
when and if brought. We are of the view, therefore, that the appli-
cants laid a sufficient basis for the issuance of the order providing for
the perpetuation of testimony and the production of the insurance
policy."
The Supreme Court of California in 1951 in Superior Insurance
Company v. The Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County,8 a
case also involving an order for the perpetuation of testimony, de-
clared:
Mandate was granted to compel the trial court to issue the subpoena and
order the witness to testify with reference to the policy ... here it is the policy
limits that are sought.... The holding is that the policy itself must be produced
6263 Mich. 30, 32, 248 N.W. 539 (1933).
710 Cal. 2d 99, 73 P. 2d 605, 607 (1937).
8 37 Cal. 2d 749, 753, 235 P. 2d 833, 835 (1951).
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and that the witness may not be permitted to confine his testimony to the fact
that insurance exists.
The court ruled that the policy was subject to inspection saying:
Petitioners here urge, however, that the sanctity of a private contract should
not be subjected at this time ... to inspection and review merely because some-
one alleges that some day he expects to sue another to enforce payment of a judg-
ment expected to some day be obtained. A sufficient answer to such a contention
is found in the fact that an automobile liability policy evidences a contractual
relation created by statute which inures to the benefit of any and every person
who might be negligently injured by the assured as completely as if such
injured person has been specifically named in the policy, i.e., a contractual rela-
tion is created between the insurer and the third parties. The provisions of
such a policy are not, therefore, a matter of sole knowledge of the named assured
and the insurance carrier to the exclusion of the injured person; the very pend-
ency of an action by the injured person brought in good faith against the named
insured person gives the former a discoverable interest in the policy....
Petitioners further argument that knowledge of the policy limits is sought in
order to provide an undue and oppressive advantage in negotiations for settle-
ment of the personal injury suit also appears to be without merit. How the
knowledge by the plaintiff in that action of facts which are known to the de-
fendants therein, concerning the policy in which the plaintiff will have an
enforceable interest if she recovers, could give her an undue and oppressive
advantage in negotiations for a settlement, does not appear. And whether such
knowledge by the plaintiff would tend to benefit plaintiff or defendant might
depend to a material extent upon the relationship between seriousness of the
injuries which resulted from the accident and the amount of insurance cover-
age provided by the policy; conceivably, knowledge of low policy limits might
constitute a benefit to defendants by tending to discourage a seriously injured
plaintiff from holding out for a settlement commensurate with the extent of the
injuries.9
It is to be noted, however, that the state of California permits a
direct suit against the insurer or the insured.
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York in
1946 in Martyn v. Braun,10 a case pertaining to pre-trial examina-
tion, stated in the syllabus that: "In action for injuries plaintiff's
motion for examination before trial of defendant on matter of liability
insurance should have been allowed."
The District Court of the United States for the Southern District
of New York in 1948 in Orgel v. McCurdy," a case relating to pre-
trial examination under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, declared:
9 Ibid., at 753, 754 and 835, 836.
10 59 N.Y.S. 2d 588 (1946).
118 F.R.D. 585 (1948).
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This is a motion by plaintiff for an order requiring defendant Garford
Trucking, Inc., by its office manager to testify on examination before trial on
all issues relating to any liability insurance carried by said defendant upon the
motor vehicle of defendant McCurdy at the time and place of the accident
which is the basis of the cause of action. Defendant objects to examination on
these matters on the ground that the "injection of this issue in the trial of this
action will seriously prejudice the defendant Garford in its defense and would
have no probative value on the contested issue of operation and control of the
vehicle involved in the accident.... ." Garford on the issue of liability insurance,
is attempting to spell out operation and control from the fact of insurance lia-
bility coverage, when, as a matter of fact, whether the defendant Garford had
liability insurance coverage on the vehicle in question at the time of the acci-
dent would depend on whether the said motor vehicle was under its operation
and control. . . . The motion is granted because the testimony plaintiff seeks
may be generally relevant to the issues in the case.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky in 1954, in Maddox v. Grau-
man, a case concerning pre-trial examination, stated: 12
The only issue raised in this action is: Must the defendant in an automobile
negligence case in a pre-trial deposition for the purpose of discovery state
whether or not he is insured and, if so, disclose the name of his insurance com-
pany and the limits of liability provided by his policy? . . . An insurance con-
tract is no longer a secret, private, confidential arrangement between the in-
surance carrier and the individual but it is an agreement that embraces those
whose person or property may be injured by the negligent act of the insured.
We conclude the answers to the propounded questions are relevant to the
subject matter of the litigation ....
Thus, under the authority of the preceding seven cases from state
courts in Michigan, California, New York and Kentucky and federal
courts in Tennessee and New York to compel the disclosure of the
defendant's insurance coverage would be proper because the evidence
elicited by such disclosure would be relevant, within the purview of
discovery and pre-trial examination.
It is noteworthy that the latest cases on the subject, both decided
in 1955 (one by the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the other by
a federal court in Tennessee) hold that the plaintiff in a pending law
suit may not compel the disclosure of the policy limits of the defend-
ant's insurance.
This legal proposition has not been decided in Illinois. It is difficult
to predict how Illinois courts will rule. It is the writer's opinion, based
on the pattern of legal thinking evidenced by decisions (1) on the
subject of disclosure of insurance coverage during a trial, and (2) on
the type of questions permitted to be asked by either attorney on the
12 205 Ky. 422, 265 S.W. 2d 939, 940, 942 (1954).
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subject of insurance in the voir dire examination of jurors, that our
courts will not permit the disclosure of the defendant's insurance
policy limits unless the Civil Practice Act is liberalized further or the
Insurance Code is modified.
A recent development which may have a far reaching effect was
the introduction in the State Senate on February 26, 1957 of Bill No.
187 for the enactment of an addition to the Illinois Insurance Code. It
reads:
SECTION 1. Section 388a is added to the "Illinois Insurance Code," approved
June 29, 1937, as amended, the added Section to read as follows:
SECTION 388a. Any company issuing a policy of insurance against liability or
indemnity for loss or damage to any person other than the insured, or to the
property of any person other than the insured, for which any insured is liable,
may be made a party defendant, as a co-party of the insured, in any suit in-
volving injury, loss or damage covered by the policy.
If Bill No. 187 becomes a law at this session of the Illinois Legisla-
ture, its ultimate effect may very well be to compel more liberal ruling
by our courts on this subject.
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